---
title: "Strategic Chokehold"
description: "Iran does not have the military strength and arsenal capability to defeat the United States in a conventional war. Yet, Iran possesses something the United…"
url: https://www.independentpress.com/article/strategic-chokehold
date: 2026-09-10
categories: ["Geopolitics","War","Oil & Gas"]
author: "Abbie Ahn"
---

# Strategic Chokehold

![Strategic Chokehold](https://images.ctfassets.net/ewtdlsoyixc1/5sXnkNhz74UG887zNaO3ag/18ec1c1e10aec512452f6d2d59c8a54a/Strait.jpg)

Iran does not have the military strength and arsenal capability to defeat the United States in a conventional war. Its economy has struggled under sanctions,[ its government faces domestic discontent](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/7/the-domestic-armed-threat-facing-iran), and much of its conventional military infrastructure has been weakened through years of conflict and pressure. Yet, Iran possesses something the United States cannot destroy: geography.

At its narrowest, the Strait of Hormuz is only about [30 nautical miles wide](https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-geography/). Despite its seemingly negligible size, it holds immense importance in the global theatre. [In 2025 alone, nearly 20 million barrels of oil passed through Hormuz every day](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/8/7/irans-grip-on-trade-is-a-potent-weapon-but-it-has-an-expiry-date) – roughly one quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Around 80 percent of that oil went to Asian markets, making the Strait vital to China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The significance of the Strait to the international economy gives Iran leverage, allowing it to threaten a choke point whose disruption immediately affects countries far beyond the Middle East. That leverage, however, comes with a fundamental weakness: Hormuz cannot function as a long-term strategy for Iran; it can only buy it time.

_Asymmetric Warfare_

The current conflict in Iran has highlighted a growing problem for the United States, namely that the cost difference between America’s advanced military technology and the weapons being used by Iran in response is proving to be detrimental. Iran does not need to destroy the American military to impose a heavy toll on Washington. Instead, it can rely on asymmetric warfare through the use of [relatively inexpensive drones, cheap munitions, cyberwarfare, and proxy networks,](https://thebulletin.org/2026/04/a-conflict-of-attrition-irans-bet-on-asymmetric-warfare/) forcing the United States to deploy extraordinarily expensive defensive systems. 

This creates an uncomfortable situation where a sophisticated American missile-defense system may successfully intercept an incoming weapon, but the economic exchange can still favor the Iranians when the weapon being intercepted costs a fraction of the defensive missile used against it. While the United States has enormous technological advantages, those advantages also require enormous resources, exposing a major vulnerability in the way that American military power is sustained. 

American military resources are not infinite. Every missile fired and every defensive system deployed is part of a larger stockpile. Reports are already suggesting that the United States is running critically low in its stocks of [Patriot missiles](https://apnews.com/article/patriot-missiles-iran-war-russia-ukraine-trump-09c7d8030a2e11fbd8ee3f7176b3f2d4), [THAAD interceptors](https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6009275-us-missile-interceptor-stocks-dwindling-dangerous/), and [other munitions](https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-munitions-crisis) because of the conflict. A prolonged war with Iran therefore raises questions extending beyond the Middle East. How quickly can the United States replace the weapons it is using? How much can it spend on one conflict while maintaining its international defensive capabilities? 

Iran’s objective therefore does not have to be the destruction of American military power. It can be enough to make American involvement increasingly expensive.

_The Chokehold is Loosening_

Though it has been effective, there is a major contradiction at the center of Iran’s military strategy. The Strait of Hormuz is powerful precisely [because the world depends on it](https://unctad.org/publication/strait-hormuz-disruptions-implications-global-trade-and-development). But this dependency also gives countries a reason to find ways around it.

During the current disruption, Saudi Arabia has increased exports through its [East-West pipeline towards the Red Sea](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/16/oil-pipeline-iran-strait-hormuz-red-sea-iraq-uae-saudi.html), while the [United Arab Emirates has pipeline infrastructure](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/new-uae-pipeline-bypassing-hormuz-now-50-complete-adnoc-ceo-says-2026-05-20/) that allows some oil exports to bypass Hormuz entirely. [The International Energy Agency estimates](https://www.iea.org/countries/saudi-arabia/oil) that Saudi Arabia and the UAE together possess approximately 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels of potential alternative export capacity. While these alternatives cannot replace Hormuz overnight, they have been able to mitigate Iran’s chokehold on the Strait. Paradoxically, the more potent Iran’s ability to strangle Hormuz, the more incentives countries have to build around it. 

The longer Hormuz remains unreliable, the more valuable alternative pipelines, ports, shipping routes, and energy suppliers become. This very same pattern has appeared elsewhere in the region. Threats from Houthi groups in Yemen have encouraged oil shippers to consider routes through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. 

Iran’s economy depends heavily on oil revenue. If other countries become less dependent on Hormuz, Tehran will lose one of its most powerful forms of economic leverage. The strategic shutdown of Hormuz could ultimately become a long-term liability for Iran. 

_Iran’s Economy Weakens_

The Iranian government was already dealing with serious economic problems before the current confrontation. The conflict has only intensified them. [Reuters reported that](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/blockade-succeeds-where-sanctions-failed-iran-oil-exports-stall-2026-09-01/) Iranian crude exports fell from roughly 2 million barrels per day in March to approximately 220,000-255,000 barrels per day in August. This creates a Catch-22. Iran can use Hormuz to make the rest of the world pay an economic price by strangling traffic through the Strait, but that same stranglehold deprives Iran of the oil revenue it needs to sustain itself. The longer the conflict lasts, the more difficult it becomes for Tehran to finance its government, maintain its economy, and suppress public dissatisfaction. This makes Hormuz a useful bargaining tool, but not a permanent solution. 

Iran’s leadership has an incentive to survive the immediate crisis and extract concessions before its leverage disappears. But if the conflict were to continue indefinitely, the pressure may begin working against Tehran itself. 

_The Choke Point on American Voters_

The economic effects stemming from the Strait of Hormuz will eventually reach American voters. Oil prices affect transportation, manufacturing, food production, agriculture and more. A prolonged disruption can therefore turn a foreign policy crisis into a domestic political issue. [Alternative shipping routes cannot fully compensate](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609078077) for the volume of energy normally transported through Hormuz. 

This matters especially as the United States approaches the 2026 midterm elections. Higher energy prices, inflation, military spending, and an increasingly prolonged conflict can all become issues in American congressional races. Members of the House and Senate must explain not only America’s foreign policy objectives to voters but also the domestic consequences of pursuing them. For the White House, this creates a difficult political equation. Military escalation may demonstrate resolve abroad while simultaneously increasing economic pressure at home. 

Iran does not need to “elect” one American party to benefit from that tension. It only needs to make the costs of continued American involvement increasingly difficult for Washington to ignore.

_Conclusion_

The greatest misconception about the Strait of Hormuz is that it is Iran’s singular weapon. Iran’s advantage comes from the immediate disruption of a system on which the global economy depends. Its leverage is strongest before alternatives have been developed, before markets have fully adjusted, and before the political costs of the crisis have been absorbed. The longer the crisis continues, the more incentive other countries have to diversify away from the Strait. The longer Iran’s oil exports remain constrained, the greater the pressure on its own economy. And the longer the United States remains involved, the more the conflict becomes entangled with domestic American politics.

Iran may not be able to defeat the United States militarily. It does not have to. For now, it can use one narrow strip of water to affect the entire world. Hormuz gives Iran a way to buy time, but the longer it relies on that weapon, the more quickly the rest of the world will learn how to live without it.