--- title: "The Empire After Empire" description: "The end of the formal empire did not mean the end of imperial power. Instead, as decolonization spread and delegitimized hard power forms of slavery and…" url: https://www.independentpress.com/article/the-empire-after-empire date: 2026-09-26 categories: ["Geopolitics"] author: "Abbie Ahn" --- # The Empire After Empire ![Picture1](https://images.ctfassets.net/ewtdlsoyixc1/2Ok0xhJvbSnh0hmiCuMCQy/0dbd042b4a0bea9577ae47e9501b5f6c/Picture1.png) The days of Western powers scrambling for control of Africa are long over. Today, Belgian atrocities in the Congo, the unfettered expansion of the British Empire, and Japanese imperialism are usually encountered in history classrooms rather than contemporary headlines. The flags of European empires have largely disappeared from the territories that they once occupied. However, the end of the formal empire did not mean the end of imperial power. Instead, as decolonization spread and delegitimized hard power forms of slavery and oppression, influence began to spread through less visible forms of soft power: trade, political pressure, military alliances, and control over international institutions, just to name a few. This transformation marked the shift from colonialism to neo-colonialism, the “new colonialism.” Ghanaian president and anticolonial theorist Kwame Nkrumah was the first to apply this term to 20th century Africa, using the term [to describe a system in which formally independent states remain economically or politically constrained by more powerful states](https://www.lse.ac.uk/africa/hub-for-african-thought/thinkers/kwame-nkrumah). Based on Nkrumah’s definition, sovereignty does not necessarily mean that a country’s economic and political choices are independent of international persuasion. Neocolonialism is a framework that clarifies how imperial relationships can persist after decolonization. Following the Second World War, the United Nations Charter was drafted, establishing sovereignty as a foundational principle of the postwar international order. In Article 2 specifically, the sovereign equality of states is recognized and requires any dispute to be settled peacefully. Most importantly, [Article 2(4)](https://www.icj-cij.org/charter-of-the-united-nations#Chapter1) requires states to refrain from the threat or use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence. These binding rules fundamentally changed the legal status of territorial conquest. A state could no longer openly justify taking another country’s territory simply by claiming that it possessed greater military or political power. Treaties such as [the Geneva Conventions](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/geneva-conventions-1949additional-protocols-and-their-commentaries) and other instruments of international humanitarian law further established rules that created a system through which sovereignty and territorial integrity became central legal protections. However, the practice of neocolonialism has enabled former colonial powers to perpetuate their dominance despite new international laws. If traditional imperialism relied on direct territorial control, modern influence operates largely through economic dependency and coercion. A country does not need to be occupied to become dependent on another state’s capital, markets, or technology. Nkrumah argued that foreign investment and trade relationships could reproduce colonial economic exploitation even after a country had gained formal independence. The United States provides one example of this complicated relationship between sovereignty and external influence. American power is not exercised through a conventional colonial empire. Instead, it operates through an enormous network of economic, diplomatic, militaristic, and institutional relationships. For example, t[he United States' imposition of extensive sanctions on the Venezuelan government](https://www.cfr.org/articles/do-us-sanctions-venezuela-work), including restrictions affecting its access to financial markets and petroleum trade, exemplifies how economic policy can become a tool of geopolitical pressure. [Congressional Research Service reports](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10715) indicate that U.S. sanctions have contributed to declines in Venezuelan oil production, alongside domestic factors including corruption, insufficient investment, and a lack of technical expertise. Whether such policies should be characterized as neocolonialism remains a matter of interpretation. The United States describes its sanctions as a means of responding to political and humanitarian conditions, while critics argue that the ability of a powerful state to impose severe economic costs on another sovereign state illustrates an imbalance in the international system. Either way, what is clear is that sovereignty does not prevent powerful states from exerting considerable influence over another country’s economy. China presents another version of the same problem: Over the past several decades, China has expanded its influence through trade, infrastructure investment, and lending. [The Belt and Road Initiative](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative) has connected Chinese capital and companies with infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. Supporters describe these projects as opportunities for development and connectivity. Critics have raised concerns about debt and political dependence, and the strategic consequences of Chinese investment. The disagreement itself reveals why the concept of neocolonialism is difficult to apply. Economic dependence does not automatically equal exploitation. A developing country can substantially benefit from foreign investment while simultaneously becoming more dependent on the country providing it. The relevant question is therefore surrounding who controls the terms of the relationship, who captures its benefits, and how much political autonomy remains when the interests of the two states diverge. The emerging international order is sometimes described as a potential transition from an American-dominant world to a Chinese one. But this framing may be too simple. The United States retains enormous influence through its military alliances, financial institutions, and role in the global financial system. China possesses extraordinary economic influence through manufacturing, trade, and increasingly sophisticated technological capabilities. This is perhaps the defining characteristic of the emerging world order. States compete not only for territory but for access to markets, natural resources, and diplomatic partnerships. The battlefield of great-power competition can therefore exist without a battlefield at all. This does not mean that contemporary international politics is simply colonialism under a new name. Sovereign states possess legal rights that colonial territories did not. Developing countries can negotiate with multiple competing powers, form regional organizations, and pursue independent policies. International institutions provide mechanisms that did not exist under nineteenth-century imperialism. Yet, the persistence of enormous disparities in economic and military power creates a fundamental contradiction. International law treats states as sovereign equals, but disparities in military power, technology, resources, and investment means that they do not wield equal influence. The central question of the twenty-first century, then, may be what imperialism looks like when territory is not the most important currency. The rules of international law have made formal conquest far more difficult to legitimize. But they cannot, by themselves, prevent powerful states from shaping the economic and political choices of weaker ones. The new struggle for influence is therefore less visible than the hard power tactics that dominated the age of imperialism. Even though the empires have lost their flags, they have not necessarily lost their power.